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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Somewhat analogous to the instant case is a recent North Dakota decision,
Littlelohn v. County Judge, Pembina County.0 One co-owner had made a
gift inter vivos of the bonds to the other co-owner. Upon the death; of the
donor a question arose as to the taxability of the bonds as part of his estate.
The court decided that there was no interest remaining in the deceased, since
his interest in the bonds had vested in the donee upon completion of the gift.
However, if the donee had died first it seems improbable that the bonds
would have gone to her estate rather than to the donor, since applicable reg-
ultations provide that the registration of the name of the owner is the sole
evidence of the ownership and payment by the government is to be made
only to the other registered owner.10 Thus, the case patently departs from
the majority view.
The purpose for which these bonds were first issued was to aid war financing.
The Uriited States Treasury Department set up regulations over the acquisi-
tion, use and disposition of these bonds in an attempt to keep litigation in-
volving these bonds at a minimum. In doing so they made these bonds a
special and unique type of property; they did not fall in any known property
category and yet had features of many different types of property. In dealing
with these bonds, it is well to keep in mind the aim with which they were
issued.
GENE KRUGER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - REVOCATION OF LICENSE AS DE-
PRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS. - Appellant, a physician and a member of the
executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, was convicted
in a federal court of contempt of Congress for failing to produce before the
House Committee on Un-American Activities certain subpoenaed papers rela-
tive to the activities of the Anti-Fascist Committee.' Subsequent to affirmance
of this conviction,2 and after having served five months in jail as a conse-
quence, appellant's license to practice medicine was suspended for six months
by the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York pursuant
to the provisions of the New York State Education Law.3 Appellant sought
a review of the determination of the Board, contending, inter alia, that the
sections of the Education Law under which disciplinary action had been taken
against him were violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court held, that the conviction be affirmed. When a determination
of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence, due process
does not require review of the exercise of its discretionary power. Barsky v.
Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 74 S. Ct. 650
(1954).
Regultaion of physicians by the state has existed at least since Hammurabi
(B.C. 2285-2242), King of Babylon compiled his famous Code embodying
9. 58 N.W. 2d 278 (N.D., 1953).
10. 31 Code Fed. Regs. §315.45(c) (1949).
1. United States v. Barsky, 72 F.Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1947).
2. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), certiorari denied, 334
U.S. 843 (1948), rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1950).
3. 5 6514, subd. 2 (b): "2. The license of registration of a practitioner of medi-
cine . . . may be revoked, suspended, or annulled . . . after due hearing in any of
the following cases: (a) . . . (b) That a physician . . . has been convicted in a court
of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state, of a crime; .... "
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provisions stipulating penalties for malpractice4 and regulating fees charge-
able for various operations.5 That the reasonable regulation of the conduct
of physicians,6 dentists, 7 optometrists,8 and similar professional classes e is a
valid exercise of the state's police power is well settled,10 as is the validity
of statutes granting to a board the power to regulate or supervise such con-
duct." Statutes vesting such boards with authority to determine finally issues
of fact, 12 to make reasonable regulations relative to the professions,13 and to
exercise wide discretionary power to revoke, suspend, or annul licenses for
reasonable cause have generally withstood the charge of unconstitutionality,"4
Revocations of licenses by such boards have been upheld unless clearly arbi-
trary, 15 or unless the grounds for revocation were so vague as not to give
fair notice, 1' Violations of the regulations of a licensing board ?7 or of a
statute,'8 unprofessional, 1, immoral,20 or unethical 21 conduct, practicing un-
der an assumed name,2 2 and advertising, deceptive 23 or otherwfse, € 4 have
been held sufficient causes for suspension of licenses.
Due process generally requires that notice and an opportunity for hearing
be given a licensee prior to revocation of a license authorizing pursuit of a
business or a profession, unless such activity can be completely prohibited
4. Harper, Francis Robert, The Code of Hammurabi. Chicago: University of Clhicago
Press; Callaghan and Co. London: Luzac and Company, 1905, p. 79, §§ 218-220.
5. Harper op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 77, 79, §§ 215-217, 221-220.
6. Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944); State v. Miller, 59 N.D. 286,
229 N.W. 569 (1930); State Board v. Ferry, 171 Pa. 372, 94 A.2d 121 (1953); State
v. Doran, 28 S.D. 486, 134 N.W. 53 (1912).
7. Bell v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 161, 65 N.E. 2d 184 (1946).
S. Fisher v. Schumacher, 72 S.2d 804 (Fla. 1954); Norwood v. Parenteau, 63
N.W.2d 807 (S.D. 1954).
9. Aitchison v. State, 105 A.2d 495 (Md. 1954); Walker v. Corwin, 210 Minn.
337, 300 N.W. 800 (1941).
10. Duren v. State Board, of Optometry, 211 Ark. 565, 201 S.W.2d 578 (1947);
Dean v. State, 116 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. 1954); Capitol Optical Co. v. State Board of
Optometry, 70 So.2d 15 (Miss. 1954); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. State Board, 213 Miss.
710, 57 So.2d 726 (1952); Davis v State, supra note 6; cf. Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch,
226 U.S. 192 (1912).
11. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903).
12. Melton v. Carter, 204 Ark. 595, 164 S.W.2d 453 (1942); Kendall v. Beiling, 295
Ky. 782, 173 S.W.2d 489 (1943).
13. Norwood v. Parenteau, supra note 8.
14. Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936), appeal dismissed, 282 U.S.
800 (1936); State ex rel. Kassabian v. State Board, 235 P.2d 327 (Nev. 1951); Board
of Medical Examiners v. Buck, 192 Ore. 66, 232 P.2d 791 (1951), afi'd 258 P.2d 124
(1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 919 (1954).
15. Lee Optical Co. v. Williamson, 120 F.Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954); cf. Davis
v. Schnell, 81 F.Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949); Blumlo v, Township Board, 309 Mich.
452, 15 N.W.2d 705 (1944); Ritter v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich. 416, 267 N.W. 641
(1936).
16. Green v. Blanchard, 138 Ark. 137, 211 S.W. 375 (1919); State ex rel. Inscho
v. Dental Board, 339 Mo. 547, 98 S.W.2d 606 (1936).
17. cf. Norwood v. Parenteau, supra note 8.
18. In re Shortridge, 53 N.D. 614, 207 N.W. 442 (1926).
19. State ex rel. Lentine v. State Board, 334 Mo. 220, 65, S.W.2d 943 (1933); Tarr
v. Hallihan, 375 IlI. 38, 30' N.E.2d 421 (1940).
20. State v. Knight, 201 Iowa 819, 216 N.W. 104 (1927); Meffert v. State Board,
66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247 (1903), afr'd, 195 U.S. 625 (1904); State ex rel. Sorenson
v. Lake, 121 Neb. 331, 236 N.W. 762 (1931).
21. State Board v. Ferry, supra note 6.
22. Berry v. Alderson, 59 Cal. 729, 211 Pac. 836 (1922).
23. Webster v. Board, 17 Cal. 534, 110 P.2d 992 (1941); Dr. Bloom Dentist v.
Cruise, 259 N.Y. 358, 182 N.E. 16 (1932), appeal dismissed, 288 U.S. 588 (1932).
24. Semler v. Oregon State Dental Examiner. 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Fisher v. Schu-
macher, supra note 8; State v. Ronet, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953).
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by the state.2 5 But upon compliance with the foregoing, neither the accord-
ance of finality to the board's interpretation of the evidence 20 nor to deter-
minations of certain questions of law 27 is violative of due process.
Here, the fact that appellant in refusing to produce the subpoenaed papers.
was acting on advice of competent legal counsel, and that the crime of which
applicant was convicted involved no moral turpitude 28 is of no material con-
sequence. Apellant's contention that the Board of Regents relied on immaterial
and prejudicial evidence of the alleged subversive activities of the Refugee
Committee in determining the extent of disciplinary action taken is likewise
unavailing in that the mere fact of appellant's conviction of a crime was suf-
ficient to sustain the Board's determination.29 Therefore, if the board has
not exceeded its jurisdictional limits and if substantial evidence supports its
findings, a final determination of the constitutional validity of the empower-
ing statute precludes judicial review of the considerations upon which the
board based its decision. 3O
The instant case, in supporting the extension of discretionary powers of
administrative boards, is in accord with the vast majority of holdings. It is
submitted that the policy thus set forth is desirable as tending not only to
facilitate the accurate and expeditious fulfilment of administrative functions,
but also to prevent an even greater crowding of court dockets, the inescapable
consequence of a contrary view.
H. M. PIPPIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW *- EQUAL PROTECTION - SEGREGATION IN RECREA-
TIONAL FACILITIES FURNISHED BY THE STATE. - Suit was brought against
the City of Baltimore and the State of Maryland by plaintiffs, adult and minor
Negroes, to enjoin segregation of the races at public swimming pools, beaches
and bathhouses. Plaintiffs claim that such segregation interferes with rights
guaranteed them by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It was stipulated at a pre-trial conference that the separate facilities
afforded the Negroes were "physically equal." The court held, that segrega-
tion of the races with respect to recreational facilities controlled by the State
(lid not deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights as long as the fa-
.ilities provided were of a substantially equal nature. Lonesome v. Maxwell,
23 F. Supp. 193 (D.Md. 1954).
Under the "separate but equal" doctrine, public facilities for Negroes and
"''hites may be separate if substantially equal.' It is not required that the
iicilities provided the different races be identical but is is sufficient if they
25. Smith v. State Board, 140 Iowa 66, 117 N.W. 1116 (1908); See Golsmith v.
nttd States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1925).
2ti. cf. Jones v. Buffalo Creek Coal Co., 245 U.S. 328 (1917); Central Land Co.
Lniidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895); U.S. v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1949).
"27. Reetz v. Michigan, supra note 11.
28. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
9. Sinclair v. United States, supra note 28; Armour Packing Co. v. United States,
t, U.S. 56 (1908).
30. Gibson v. Medical Examining Board, 141 Conn. 218, 104 A.2d 890 (1954);
,to cx rel, Kassabian v. State Board, supra note 14; Schnure v. Board of Regents, 130
Y.S. 2d 783 (N.Y. 1954); Davis v. Board of Regents, 283 App. Div. 591, 128 N.Y.S.2d
(1954); cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943);
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Bates and Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. '106
I. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
